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Abstract Background
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) performed the Space Transportation
Architecture Study (STAS) to provide information to
support end-of-the-decade decisions on possible near-
term US Government (USG) investments in space
transportation. To gain a clearer understanding of the
costs and benefits of the broadest range of possible
space transportation options, six teams, five from
aerospace industry companies and one internal to
NASA, were tasked to answer three primary
questions:
- if the Space Shuttle system should
be replaced;
if so, when the replacement should
take place and how the transition
should be implemented; and
if not, what is the upgrade strategy
to continue safe and affordable
flight of the Space Shuttle beyond
2010.
The overall goal of the Study was "to develop
investment options to be considered by the
Administration for the President's FY2001 budget to
meet NASA's future human space flight requirements
with significant reductions in costs." This emphasis
on government investment, coupled with the
participation by commercial f'trms, required an
unprecedented level of economic analysis of costs
and benefits from both industry and government
viewpoints.
This paper will discuss the economic and market
models developed by the in-house NASA Team to
analyze space transportation architectures, the results
of those analyses, and how those results were
reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of
the STAS NASA Team.
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One of the traditional roles of governments is to
provide or nurture infrastructure upon which
commerce is built. Highways, ships, airports and
railways are historical examples of transportation
infrastructure that governments around the world
have either built or enabled. In the past, when a
particular transportation industry has been too
immature to satisfy the requirements of the United
States Government (USG), the Government has faced
a choice of either doing the transportation job itself or
helping the industry to mature enough to do it.
The USG now faces that decision again, this time in
its requirements for human space transportation. The
launch vehicle industry closely parallels historical
transportation industry examples, and this enabling
transportation infrastructure could have significant
benefits in both strategic and economic terms. The
USG could make long-term investments to enable the
exploitation of the resources of space; however, such
an investment would need to be justified by a clear
strategic or economic benefit to the US.
The President's National Space Transportation
Policy t describes a "decision...by the end of the
decade" about the development of a next-generation
reusable launch vehicle (RLV) that could serve
national space transportation needs; however, this is
not just one decision, made by NASA, which is
scheduled for December 3 I, 1999. Rather, this must
be a complex series of interdependent decisions and
contingent commitments made by several USG
entities, multiple space transportation companies, and
their customers and suppliers. The proper timing for
the execution of this sequence will be determined by
the optimum alignment of the financial and strategic
interests of the USG and aerospace industry, but
investments and policy decisions by the USG could
greatly accelerate or decelerate the pace.
Earlier this year, NASA undertook a comprehensive
look into the future of space launch in the United
States, the Space Transportation Architecture Study
(STAS). As the name implies, the study was to
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evaluateNASA'soptions,notonlyatthelevelof
individuallaunchvehiclelementsorsystems,but
alsoatamuchhigher"architecture"l vel,which
includesthetechnologyandinfrastructure
investmentsa sociatedwithmultiplelaunchsystems
andtheftpossiblebenefitstoNASA.This paper does
not reflect the final economic analysis of the Space
Transportation Architecture Study, nor the overall
conclusions of the STAS, only those of the internal
NASA Team.
The primary questions concerned NASA's human
space flight requirements. With its limited budget,
should NASA pursue significant upgrades of the
venerable Space Shuttle, adaptation of other existing
systems such as expendable launch vehicles (ELVs)
to NASA human spaceflight requirements, or
investment in new RLV systems? Can NASA's
human space transportation requirements be
commercialized, or should the agency operate the
Shuttle until the nation provides funding for NASA
to develop the next generation launcher?
NASA Goals
Reducing the risk and cost of access to space is third
on NASA's list of its most important priorities. Even
the high reliability of the Shuttle, relative to ELVs,
leaves too much chance for loss of human life, and
the cost of access to space is the major obstacle to
commercial development of space and continued
human exploration of the Solar System. Since
NASA's top two priorities, the safe continued flight
of the Space Shuttle and the successful construction
of the International Space Station, are oriented
toward implementing existing programs, NASA's
third priority, safer, lower-cost access to space, is its
number one development goal. 2
Some progress has already been made over the last
few years in the reduction of launch costs and prices.
The EELV Program is reducing commercial
expendable launcher prices by as much as 35% below
the previous generation. Space Shuttle Program costs
have declined by a similar percentage over the last
decade. However, to orbit the amount of material
necessary to continue human exploration again, these
improvements must be improved upon by an order of
magnitude.
A less visionary--but more irrtmediate--.--need of
NASA is to reduce the predicted cost of serving the
International Space Station (ISS) with logistical
support and crew rotation. Moreover, even the
relatively-high reliability levels of the two current
ISS-capable crewed launch systems, the Space
Shuttle and the Russian Soyuz, leave a significant
possibility that an event will occur that will interrupt
the flow of logistics to the ISS. The need for
increased alternate access to the Station in its
operational phase makes development of a new
human-capable system desirable.
At the same time, the Space Shuttle provides many
valuable capabilities to NASA, some of which may
not be duplicated by a vehicle that is designed to be
successful in the commercial launch market. Space
transportation is central to NASA's activities, so any
move toward "outsourcing" this function must be
deliberate and well-conceived, considering not only
the cost of transportation but also the unique
characteristics of both incumbent and new
architectures.
The STAS NASA Team
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Figure 1: Space Transportation Architecture
Study Team Structure
The STAS NASA Team was only one part of a much
larger effort, managed by NASA's Deputy Chief
Engineer for Space Transportation under the
direction of the Chief Engineer (Figure 1). Six
working-level teams, five from aerospace industry
companies and one internal to NASA, participated in
the evaluation of architectures. After these six teams
completed their work, an independent evaluation and
normalization of their results was conducted by the
NASA Independent Program Assessment Office
(IPAO) at Langley Research Center. Advisory groups
received mid-term and final briefings from each
working-level team and the independent evaluation
group. Work is proceeding on integration of the
results into a NASA space transportation investment
strategy.
The in-house NASA Team brought several unique
approaches to the STAS. Because it was not
advocating any proprietary solutions, this team could
objectively evaluate the broadest range of
possibilities. While industry teams concentrated on
the STAS baseline analysis period out to 2020, the
NASA Team analyzed both the baseline period to
2020 and an extended period to 2030 that more
completely described the benefits of new systems,
especially from the government perspective. The
NASA Team also evaluated their Architectures on
their support for human exploration of Mars. Most
importantly, the in-house team developed a flexible
framework for analysis, economic modeling, and
decision support that can be easily expanded and
updated in the future as more information becomes
available about NASA's space transportation
architecture options.
The ten NASA Team members represented six
NASA field centers and the Air Force Research
Laboratory. In the three-month span to which the
NASA Team effort was limited, several
accommodations were necessary to produce a
meaningful product. While the STAS guidelines
described a broad range of scenarios and evaluation
criteria, the NASA Team kept their analysis at a high
level and focused it on the most probable
representative scenarios and a few discriminating,
quantifiable metrics. Their primary scope was
commercialization of NASA's earth-to-orbit human
transportation requirements, in the context of the
growing commercial uncrewed launch market.
Subteams were formed to focus on Architecture
Options, Vehicle Elements, Economics, Safety and
Reliability, and Capabilities. Five representative
Architectures framed the analysis:
I. Shuttle with limited upgrades;
2. Shuttle with a Reusable First Stage (RFS) to
replace the Solid Rocket Boosters;
3. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs)
with a new Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV);
4. a two-stage to orbit (TSTO) RLV with CTV; and
5. a single-stage to orbit (SSTO) RLV with CTV.
Options were identified for analysis within each
Architecture, such as evolution of the RFS into a
smaller, uncrewed commercial satellite launch
system. The new launch vehicle elements within the
Architectures, such as the RFS, TSTO and SSTO,
were based on previously-studied concepts that had
been defined in sufficient technical detail to facilitate
high-level analysis.
The top-level criteria chosen by the NASA Team fell
into two categories: quantitative and qualitative. The
qualitative criteria--Resiliency, Continuity,
Competition, Mission Capabilities, US
Competitiveness, and US Technological
Leadership---were evaluated in Team discussions,
since metrics and tools for evaluating Architectures
against these criteria could not have been developed
in the time available to the NASA Team.
The four quantitative criteria were:
- Reliability (Probability of Mission Success);
- Safety (Probability of Crew Safe Return);
- Technical Risk (Probability of Successful System
Deployment); and
Discounted Life Cycle Cost to NASA.
Economic Analysis Approach
The primary economic metric for each Architecture
was the total discounted life-cycle cost (LCC) to
satisfy NASA's space transportation needs from earth
to orbit. This LCC comprises three elements:
International Space Station (ISS) logistics and crew
rotation mission costs, NASA science launch costs,
and space transportation technology costs.
For existing space transportation systems, those
budgets (in the 2004 time frame) were estimated to
be S2.4B for ISS missions on the Shuttle _,$350M for
science flights on ELVs, and $300M in space
transportation technology funding, for a total of •
$3.05B per year (in 1999 dollars). This available
budget stream was defined as the Reference Budget,
which summed to $35.3B (to 2030, 7% real discount
rate). The Reference Cost for satisfying NASA's
existing space transportation requirements, not
including technology funding for future space
transportation, totals to $2.75B per year, or $32.0B
discounted to 2030.
For each Architecture, two scenarios were examined:
commercial and USG-funded. That is, the investment
in significant upgrades or a new launch system could
be made primarily by either industry or NASA. This
investment, or non-recurring cost, includes the
development and production costs of upgraded
elements or new vehicles as well as the necessary
facilities. Whether upgrades or new launch system
investments are made by the USG or industry, some
non-commercial elements, such as a CTV designed
specifically for ISS crew rotation, were assumed to
be funded by the USG.
In a government-developed scenario, NASA's LCC
would simply be the total of technology programs,
non-recurring costs and operating (recurring) costs
for all required elements. While NASA would bear
the entire investment in non-recurring costs, benefits
from this approach would be reaped downstream
because NASA would pay only recurring costs--not
price, which also includes industry profit--for each
flight. However, national space policy precludes
USG launchers from competing with commercial
launchers, so a USG-funded system would not be
able to service the commercial launch market.
In a commercial scenario, a company would make the
necessary investments to field a new launcher, and
then NASA would purchase services from the
commercial operator, rather than operating the
system. If new system investments are made by
industry, they do not appear in the NASA LCC
directly, but indirectly through two categories of
NASA costs: the prices per t'tight charged to NASA,
and the costs of incentives given to the launch
provider to encourage the development of a human-
capable system.
The NASA LCC for each commercial Architecture,
then, includes:
ISS mission costs, including flight prices and
NASA-funded, [SS-specific crew and cargo
transfer systems;
NASA science mission flight costs;
the cost of the technology program necessary to
realize a new system; and
- the costs to NASA of incentives offered to
industry.
Economic Modeling
The emphasis on commercial involvement in the
STAS demanded a great depth and breadth in
analysis. Not only must cost and benefits be tallied
on the government's side, but also on that of industry,
to ensure an acceptable level of profitability. In
addition, the business case is based partially on the
ability of the new launcher to satisfy the requirements
of the commercial launch market, which USG-owned
vehicles cannot service according to US space policy.
Thus, the suitability of each launch system for the
commercial market must be modeled to properly
address the extent to which an A.rchitecture can
leverage commercial markets to lower NASA's LCC.
To facilitate a quick start and rapid turnaround of
analysis, three existing models were used (and
significantly enhanced) for the STAS NASA Team
effort by the Economics Subteam, led by Joe
Hamaker (Manager, Engineering Cost Office, NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center). These models were
developed to model specific aspects of launch vehicle
economics: commercial viability, market suitability,
and NASA life-cycle cost.
The first model, the RLV Economic Case Study
Model, was developed to evaluate business cases
constructed around a newly-developed RLV. In a
broader sense, it is equally applicable to an existing
system such as the Shuttle, if it is commercialized;
that is, it requires an initial investment from the
commercial operator and provides returns on the
investment. This model has been used previously to
explore the effects of a wide range of launch industry
incentives,includingovernmentcapitalization,
governmentguaranteedloans,varioustaxincentives
andotherformsoffinancialaid,onboththe
commerciall unchsystembusinesscaseandonthe
netpresentvalueofgovernmentbenefitsfromsucha
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next-generation launch system.
The second model, the RLV Market Analysis Model
developed by Frank A. Prince, estimates the annual
flight rate of a commercial launcher, given a price per
flight and vehicle capability. The STAS guidelines
listed several sources for mission and market data 5,
which were incorporated into the model for the
NASA Team analysis. Three different methods are
used in this model to convert mission data to flight
rates _n three types of market segments: inelastic
(ISS), non-elastic (existing), and elastic (emerging).
Inelastic market segments (such as the US ISS
logistics manifest) do not grow, nor do their
purchasing habits change, as a launch provider's
price changes, as long as the price is below a certain
threshold. Non-elastic market segments, such as
existing satellite communications service providers,
also do not grow as price is reduced; however, a
lower-priced provider may capture more of the
market from its competitors. This market capture for
a new launch system is estimated in the model by
comparing its price per flight to the database of
competitors with a similar weight capacity to a
particular destination orbit.
Elastic market segments, on the other hand, grow as
prices are reduced, which indicates the creation of a
new customer base. If a new space transportation
system were to reduce prices enough to elicit an
elastic market response, not only would it corner that
market segment, but it would also create new space
businesses, providing macroeconomic benefits to the
US in increased employment and to the USG in
increased personal and corporate income taxes. 6
The third model, the STAS Life-Cycle Cost Model,
was adapted tbr several uses m this analysis from the
Access to Space Life-Cycle Cost Model by David
Taylor. One version of this model was used to
integrate the other models, summarizing the NASA
discounted life-cycle cost, both to the baseline period
of 2020 and to the extended 2030 horizon. Another
version of the model was used to provide detailed
yearly industry costs for the RLV Economic Case
Study Model. Yet another version was used in the
USG-funded cases, where no industry analysis was
necessary.
Assumptions
System-level cost estimates were constructed for
development, production, operations and facilities for
elements within each Architecture and its options.
These life-cycle cost estimates assumed maturation
of technology and development culture, projecting
40-60% reductions in vehicle development and
production cost from historical experience, e.g. the
Space Shuttle, and more significant operations cost
and turnaround reductions, even for commercial
Shuttle Architectures. Assumption of reductions in
operations cost of approximately 25% below the
$2.4B projection were necessary to close the business
cases for the commercialized Shuttles in
Architectures l and 2.
Assumed improvements in both technology and
management must occur for these costs to be
achievable. The technologies used in development of
the launch systems must all have reached a maturity
on NASA's Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
scale of six or greater, which means that they have
been used in an operational launch vehicle, tested in a
system-level flight demonstration program (such as
NASA's Future-X), or ground-tested with relevant
environmental stresses to simulate the operational
environment, including cycle testing. In contrast, the
immaturity of some then-cutting-edge technologies
used in the Space Shuttle increased its development
cost and schedule and still increase operations costs
and turnaround time. In a commercial environment,
immature technologies are recognized as a threat, and
they have a more difficult time buying their way into
the launch system design.
Perhaps more importantly, the management
environment must be structured to eliminate the
major causes of project schedule slip and cost
overrun and to ensure that the system meets its
customers' needs. Requirements must be well-
structured, well-allocated, logically traded, and very
rarely modified. Procedures must be streamlined and
specifications tailored to reduce non-value-added
effort. Multi-discipline product teams at every level
must have the proper tools, including not only
hardware and software, but also authority,
responsibility, and direct lines of communication.
Although cost estimates assumed "new ways of doing
business," the aggressiveness of these estimates was
tempered by a thorough accounting of other costs.
First, the costs of technical risk were included,
specific to each Architecture. A probability
distribution of likely schedule slip was calculated
6basedon the cha_ractcristlcs of the vehicle system.
then translated into an expected value of cost. Next.
an esttmate of the cost of the technology program
necessary for reaching TRL 6 was included. Finally.
the cost of catastrophic unreliability for each
Architecture was included, based on several cost
impacts: the production of additional vehicles to
replace expected flight capacity loss due to
catastrophic events; investigation of the cause of
failure; cost of the remedial actions to the remaining
fleet; and loss of revenue during the system down
time for investigation and fleet remedies. (The
expected cost of replacing a Shuttle Orbiter was not
included in Architectures I and 2, since the loss of
one Orbiter would not jeopardize the ability of the
system to service the predicted mission model.) In
estimation of all cost components, relative
consistency of analysis and valid differentiation
across the different Architectures were valued more
than the absolute values of the cost estimates, which
cannot in any case be accurately described by a
deterministic, point value estimate.
Closed business cases were constructed for each
commercially-developed launch system project, with
an assumed average before-ta,x hurdle rate for equity
investors of 25% per year. Business cases were
closed, i.e., adjusted to 25% before-tax return on
equity (BTROE) by increasing NASA ISS mission
price per flight (PPF). In this way, ISS PPF was used
to transfer benefits between Industry and the USG.
(Note: a 5% change in industry BTROE, near 25%,
results in an opposite change of roughly 5;I- 1.5B
LCC to NASA, discounted @ 7%.)
()t course, industry will net voluntarily limit itself to
any particular level of profitability. In order to obtain
lower launch prices, given that the costs of the
launcher would still permit profitable operation, one
or more of several mechanisms would be required.
These mechanisms could include advance purchase
agreements for launch services, government
regulation, partial government ownership, or market-
based competition. In any case, this analysis assumes
that industry profitability in excess of 25% BTROE is
returned to NASA through reduced ISS mission PPF.
Another way to transfer benefits, from the USG to
industry, is through government incentives. The
Economics Subteam's analysis indicated that it
would be in NASA's best interests to incentivize a
commercial launch provider to either develop a new
ISS-capable system or commercialize existing
systems. The baseline incentives package, $1B in
development assistance and a government-guaranteed
loan, was chosen based on previous work on the cost-
effectiveness of various government incentives for
commercial launch systems, which was verified in
the Economics Subteam's early analysis of the
Architectures adopted by the STAS NASA Team.
STAS NASA Team Conclusions
Unfortunately, no significant LCC discrimination
was found between most Architectures, although
each was different in terms of investment profile and
potential savings, as shown in Figure 2 below. The
Figure 2: STAS NASA In-House Team Economic Summary of Commercial Architectures
discounted LCC to NASA of each Architecture
commercial scena.no to 2030 was below the
discounted total Reference Cost of $32.0B, and all
were within 10% of each other. The USG-funded
scenario for each Architecture had a higher LCC to
NASA than the commercial scenario, due to removal
of the benefits of leverage with commercial launch
markets.
The commercial scenario analysis excluded
Architecture 3, EELV, because a commercial
analysis could not be done. The NASA Team did not
have access to technical, cost and revenue data for
the two competing EELV product lines, so the
investment and return criteria used for the other
commercial scenarios could not be ran. If the EELV
price per flight could be lowered about 40% from
current quoted prices, the EELV Architecture LCC to
NASA would be competitive. Using publicly-
available prices for EELV flights, though, the LCC to
NASA was estimated to be significantly higher than
the other Architectures and the Reference Cost, and
even slightly higher than the Reference Budget.
Each Architecture was found to have strengths and
weaknesses among the other criteria, but no one
Architecture rated highly among all criteria. Vehicle
systems with CTV capability for crew survival and
recovery were evaluated highly on safety criteria; the
Shuttle-based Architectures had a relatively low
investment and technical risk. The NASA Team
agreed to summarize their findings in the following
way.
Not enough knowledge is available today
to commit to a Shuttle replacement.
If NASA is primarily interested in
maintaining the unique capabilides of the
Space Shuttle (servicing, crew, etc.) while
reducing its costs for ISS transportation at
low risk, it should pursue Architecture 1,
knowing that eventually Shuttle will have
to be replaced. However, Shuttle's flight
rate capability (10/yr) limits commercial
potential and will not expand the U.S.
share of space market.
If NASA is primarily interested in
stimulating the commercial market and
enabling an expansion of the U.S. market
share, it should pursue Architecture 4 or 5.
Additional Observations
The achievement of true competition in a very
limited and complex human transportation market
will be very difficult in the near-term commercial
launch marketplace. The level of USG and industry
investment necessary to develop one new human-
capable launch system would not double if two
competing systems were developed, but the
additional investments would be significant. Not only
would non-recurring costs increase significandy, but
each system's leverage with commercial markets
would be reduced, due to the addition of an
additional competitor into what is still a fairly
immature market. Subsequent analysis has estimated
that, on the USG side, the additional investment to
obtain alternate human access to space, discounted
over the life cycle to 2030, could near $109, about a
third of the total Architecture discounted LCC.
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Figure 3: Single-Stage to Orbit (Architecture 5)
NASA Life-Cycle Cost Sensitivities
Several sensitivity analyses, as shown in Figure 3,
were conducted to identify primary economic drivers
in the Architectures. Since the time-value of money is
such a powerful factor in a commercial environment,
the NASA LCC of the SSTO Architecture is as
sensitive to the earlier 6 years of development cost as
k _s co the later life-cycle operations cost over the 2[
years of flights. (In the above graph, these two lines
lie atop one another, slanting up and to the right.)
Even if a second-generation RLV could be financed
solely by industry, the price levels required by
industrytoprovideadequater turnsfor
investors--whileamortizingloansathigh-risk
lendingrates--wouldprobablybetoo high to reduce
NASA's price per flight or to open significant new
launch service customer markets. However,
government investment in RLV development, in the
form of incentives, could increase profitability and
reduce risk for launch service providers, ultimately
reducing NASA's cost much more than the cost of
the incentives. In the commercial scenarios of every
Architecture, incentivized cases showed a lower
discounted LCC to NASA than non-incentivized.
In particular, the government-guaranteed loan was
shown to be not only the most effective incentive
considered, but the single most significant factor in
the viability of the business case for a commercial
launch system---and thus the most efficient USO
action to enable reduction of launch prices. As shown
in the Architecture 5 sensitivity analysis graph
(Figure 3), the only excursion that increased LCC
above the Reference Budget was the removal of the
government-guaranteed loan (bold dashed line
toward the left axis). Sensitivity analyses of other
commercial Architectures yielded similar results.
Subsequent analysis indicates that tax incentives, for
the same effectiveness, have much greater costs to
the USG. For example, the guaranteed loan has
similar effects on launcher after-tax equity returns to
those of an 80% research and experimentation credit
(with no exclusions or limitations), and greater
effects than a tax holiday that lasts for the entire life
of the project.
Long-term investment in transportation technology
and infrastructure generates broad societal benefits
and is an appropriate and common historical role for
governments. Historically, these investments are
initi',dly justified through projected benefits to
national security or world leadership. In the absence
of compelling military investments for development
of the next frontier, though, the role of transportation
infrastructure development for commerce and
settlement tails to civil agencies, such as NASA and
the US Departments of Commerce and
Transportation.
In order to justify these investments, however, the
uncertainty surrounding these analyses must be
reduced or quantified. Simple, user-friendly tools for
discounted cash flow analysis and US Government
investment planning must be developed, to encourage
wider use of these most important and gravely under-
utilized techniques during technology planning and
design trade studies. The emerging space market
must be more rigorously studied to provide a much-
needed update to the 1994 Commercial Space
Transportation Study (CSTS). Macroeconomic
models could then be refined to portray more
completely the broad range of benefits from lower-
priced launcher development outside of NASA LCC,
such as military launch savings and employment and
tax revenue increases. Of course, technology
uncertainty must be strategically reduced through
continued flight and ground test programs. Finally,
analysis and simulation tools must be improved to
properly evaluate alternative concepts and
investments, including explicit, realistic assessments
of the remaining uncertainty and risk.
These kinds of smaller investments over the next few
years wi[1 ensure that the larger investments to come
in space transportation in the United States will bring
the maximum return to NASA, the US Government,
the nation, and the world.
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